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DR. CHARLES SELL has spent the last five years confined to a fed-
eral psychiatric facility awaiting trial for charges of Medicaid fraud and
money laundering, a trial he is not competent to undergo at present
because he suffers from delusional disorder, persecutory subtype, a
rare psychological condition.1 His confinement has exceeded his pos-
sible imprisonment under the federal sentencing guidelines. Why
does Dr. Sell continue to wait for a trial that may never happen? Dr.
Sell waits-often in solitary confinement-because he does not want
to take antipsychotic medication the government hopes will make him
competent to stand trial. 2 In April 2001, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ordered the administration
of such medication over Dr. Sell's objection, upholding a decision by
a federal magistrate. 3 In May 2002, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit upheld that order.4 Yet Dr. Sell persisted in his
objection and sought appeal in the Supreme Court. His petition for
certiorari was granted and Dr. Sell believed the end of his ordeal was
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1. See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 2174
(2003).
2. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-22, United States v. Sell, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No.
02-5664).
3. United States v. Sell, No. 4:98CR177DJS 4:97CR209DJS (E.D. Mo. Aug. 9, 2000)
(order approving involuntary medication).
4. See Sell, 282 F.3d 560, vacated, 123 S. Ct. 2174.
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finally in sight. He could never have predicted that his very ability to
seek judicial review would rest on the application of an obscure doc-
trine of appellate procedure hardly recognized by the ordinary prac-
ticing lawyer.
Mere days before oral argument, the parties received an order
from the Court for supplemental briefs on the issue of the court of
appeal's jurisdiction to review the district court's order supporting the
magistrate's determination that involuntary medication was war-
ranted.5 The jurisdictional issue was clearly at the forefront of the
minds of several of the Justices. Indeed, counsel for Dr. Sell spent a
large portion of his argument time addressing questions about the
appellate court's jurisdiction over an order of involuntary medication
in an attempt to render a pretrial detainee competent to stand trial
for nonviolent crimes.6 This focus on jurisdiction by the Court was
particularly interesting in light of the fact that the United States had
not challenged appellate jurisdiction at any point during the proceed-
ing and did not challenge it in its supplemental brief, but rather had
acknowledged jurisdiction, agreeing with the circuit courts that had
already examined the issue and found it satisfied the requirements for
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 7 However,
what the Court recognized is that the only way the court of appeals
would have had jurisdiction to review the order before trial was if it
met the narrow requirements of the collateral order doctrine, some-
thing difficult to do and particularly onerous in criminal proceedings.
With its analysis of the order in Sell, the Court stepped onto a
path of further convolution and inconsistency in this complicated
area of law. In the end, its opinion would not serve to untangle the
web but rather would add new twists and knots for litigants and appel-
late courts to confront in the future.
Section I of this article will discuss the background of the collat-
eral order doctrine. Section IA reviews the "final judgment rule" and
the policies underlying it. Section IB reviews the collateral order doc-
trine itself, beginning with its inception in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.,8 and continuing through an overview of the Court's civil
5. See Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 1230, 1230 (2003) (order requesting supplemen-
tal briefs on jurisdiction).
6. See oral argument transcript at 3-10, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)
(No. 02-5664).
7. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (No.
02-5664); and Supplemental Brief for Respondent, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174
(2003) (No. 02-5664).
8. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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collateral order jurisprudence illustrating the development of the "re-
quirements" for attaining appellate review under the doctrine. Section
IC concludes with an overview of the doctrine's application to crimi-
nal cases. Section II will examine the role of "important rights" in the
Court's collateral order cases and will attempt to determine whether
"importance" is an additional requirement of the collateral order test.
In addition, the section will seek to define what the Court means by an
"important" right or issue, and to explain the view that some rights are
sufficiently "important" to outweigh costs of piecemeal appeals. Sec-
tion III will consider the "unreviewability" requirement of the collat-
eral order doctrine, specifically what constitutes an "unreviewable"
order under the doctrine and what, if anything, is the distinction be-
tween an "unreviewable" order and an order that leads to "irreversi-
ble" harm. Finally, Section IV will return to the most recent case in
which the Court discussed and applied the collateral order doctrine,
Sell v. United States,9 contending that both the majority's markedly
broad reading and the dissent's highly restrictive view of both the col-
lateral order doctrine's requirements and its application to pretrial
involuntary medication orders are inconsistent with and further com-
plicate the Court's prior collateral order jurisprudence. Finally, it will
propose a way that the collateral order doctrine could be applied in
the involuntary medication setting while upholding the doctrine's
narrow application and furthering the policies behind the final judg-
ment rule.
I. Background
A. The Final Judgment Rule and Its Underlying Policy
Finality is central to the American system of appellate jurisdic-
tion, and as such, the necessity of a final judgment as a prerequisite
for bringing an appeal is not easily ignored. In fact there is no consti-
tutional right to an appeal. Appeal rights in civil cases were instituted
by statute in 1889, but the right to appeal criminal cases did not come
about until 1911.10
The statutory basis for jurisdiction of the United States courts of
appeals is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.11 This section evidences a con-
gressional policy against interlocutory or "piecemeal appeals" and
9. 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
10. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (recognizing district court's
denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is appealable under collateral
order doctrine).
11. The statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
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stresses the requirement of "finality" as a prerequisite for federal ap-
pellate jurisdiction.1 2 Often referred to as the "final judgment rule,"
the statute gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over "final decisions
of the district courts" of the United States.1 3 Additional appellate juris-
diction for interlocutory orders deemed to involve "a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation" is granted under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 14 However, this provision applies only to civil
cases-not to criminal cases.
The final judgment rule is rooted in the need to promote effi-
cient and effective judicial administration at both the trial and appel-
late levels. The United States Supreme Court articulated the
importance of efficiency and its role in the final judgment rule when
it stated:
Since the right to ajudgment from more than one court is a matter
of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress from
the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on ap-
peal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself
against enfeebling judicial administration .... To be effective, judi-
cial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum
would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component
elements in a unified cause. These considerations of policy are es-
pecially compelling in the administration of criminal justice ....
An accused is entitled to scrupulous observance of constitutional
safeguards. But encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication
of the criminal law.15
In addition to creating problems of cost, inconvenience, and de-
lay, appeals before a final judgment can undermine the workings of
the trial court. Appellate courts owe a level of deference to trial court
rulings that precede a final judgment. Allowing interlocutory review
of such rulings threatens trial judges' independence and ability to su-
The courts of appeals (other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to
the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
12. Abney, 431 U.S. at 656.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
14. Id. § 1292(b).
15. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
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pervise proceedings in their courts 16 and forces appellate courts to
hear appeals based on incomplete records and involving rulings that,
if the trial had gone on to its conclusion, may have been
inconsequential. 17
Members of the federal judiciary have cited the importance of
adherence to the final judgment rule as they address problems of ap-
pellate overload in the federal system. In his dissenting opinion in
Behrens v. Pelletier,18 Justice Breyer attacked the Court's decision to cre-
ate an exception to the final judgment rule as a "threat[ ] [to] busy
appellate courts ... at a time when overloaded dockets threaten the
federal appellate system." He quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist's re-
marks to the Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit saying: "One of the chief
needs of our generation is to deal with the current appellate capacity
crisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals. Few could argue about the
existence of such a crisis, born of spiraling federal filings and an in-
creased tendency to appeal District Court decisions." 19 Justice Breyer
further stressed the importance of adhering to the finaljudgment rule
by citing statements from the Judicial Conference of the United
States's 1995 "Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts," which con-
cluded that if the courts of appeals continue on their current course,
"it may be necessary to consider some limitations on the right to
appeal."20
Yet, despite its statutory basis and the policies underlying the final
judgment rule, the Court has recognized that there are situations
where the rule must bend to avoid "the danger of denying justice by
delay ... ."21 Appealability is decided for categories of orders rather
than for individual orders, so appellate courts cannot engage in a
case-by-case balancing of the interests involved in order to determine
16. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430, 436 (1985) ("[T]he dis-
trict judge has primary responsibility to police the prejudgment tactics of litigants, and...
can better exercise that responsibility if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to
second-guess prejudgment rulings."); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (the final judgment rule recognizes the "independence of the district
judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system.").
17. SeeJohnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).
18. 516 U.S. 299, 322 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. Id. (quoting Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Tenth Annual Judi-
cial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D.
256, 257 (Apr. 30, 1992)).
20. Id. (quoting Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the
Federal Courts 132 (Dec. 1995)).
21. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
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whether immediate appeal is appropriate. 22 Thus, when deciding the
appealability of a category, the Court should look to the "competing
considerations underlying all questions of finality" including costs and
inconvenience of piecemeal review on the one hand and the "danger
of denying justice by delay" on the other.23 The means for achieving
such a balance and allowing immediate appeal when appropriate is
found in the collateral order doctrine.
B. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation and Its Progeny-
Defiming the "Test" for Appealable Collateral Orders
The purpose of the collateral order doctrine 24 is to identify a
"class of orders where the error-correcting benefits of immediate ap-
peal likely outweigh the costs, delays, diminished litigation coherence,
and waste of appellate court time potentially associated with multiple
appeals."25 Because appeals allowed under the collateral order doc-
trine are exceptions to the final judgment rule, "the distinction be-
tween a final order and an interlocutory order that is nonetheless
appealable under the collateral order doctrine is, as a practical mat-
ter, purely terminological." 26
The collateral order doctrine originated in 1949 in the Court's
decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 27 a stockholder de-
rivative action. The case centered on whether a federal district court
exercising diversity jurisdiction was obligated to apply a state statute
passed during the pendency of the litigation. 28 In 1943, Cohen, a
stockholder, brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey against Beneficial Industrial Loan Corpora-
tion claiming that the corporation and its management defrauded the
corporation and its stockholders in excess of $100,000,000 over a pe-
riod of more than eighteen years. 29 Cohen owned a small number of
Beneficial's total stock, only 100 shares of more than two million to-
tal.30 Other stockholders intervened in the action, bringing the total
22. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995).
23. Id.
24. For an extensive discussion of the evolution of the collateral order doctrine, pre-
dictions of future trends, and recommendations for action, see Lloyd C. Anderson, The
Collateral Order Doctrine: A New "Serbonian Bog" and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REv.
539 (1998).
25. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 315 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. S.E.C., 873 F.2d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
27. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
28. Id. at 543.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 544.
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share of stock represented by the plaintiffs in the action to approxi-
mately 0.0125% of the total.3 ' In 1945 the New Jersey legislature
passed a statute, made applicable to pending actions, that held a
plaintiff with "small"32 interests liable for "reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees of the defense if he fail[ed] to make good his com-
plaint and . . . entitles the corporation to indemnity before the case
[could] be prosecuted. '3 3 Beneficial moved to enforce the statute
against Cohen and the intervenors and to require a security bond of
$125,000. The district court disagreed and ruled that the New Jersey
statute did not apply to the action pending in federal court. Beneficial
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which re-
versed. Cohen filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted. 34
Before it could address the merits of the case and the Third Cir-
cuit's decision, the Court had to articulate a basis for appellate juris-
diction absent a final judgment on the merits of the stockholder's
derivative action. It was here that the Court set forth three bases for its
decision to grant an immediate appeal despite the fact that this order
was not a final judgment in the case. First, the order represented a
final decision on only the particular issue involved. In its decision, the
Court explained that "It] he effect of [section 1291] is to disallow ap-
peal from any decision which is tentative, informal, or incomplete.
Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of interven-
tion. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,
there may be no intrusion by appeal." 35 The Court held that the dis-
trict court's refusal to apply the statute to Cohen's action was a "final"
decision because the district court had no intention of revisiting the
issue later in the litigation. 36
Second, the Court reasoned that the order warranted immediate
appeal because it constituted a final decision on an issue that was sep-
arate or separable from the substantive merits of the case. That meant
the issue had to be one that would not "merge" into the underlying
stockholder's derivative action. This order was not a "step[ ] toward
final judgment in which [it would] merge."3 7 In other words, an inter-
locutory appeal and decision on this issue was not of a nature that it
31. See id.
32. Small is defined as less than five percent of the aggregate.
33. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 544-45.
34. Id. at 545.
35. Id. at 546.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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would either "affect, or ... be affected by" the ultimate decision on
the merits of the case. 38
Finally, the finality and separability of the order created a situa-
tion where review after final judgment would come too late-the
rights conferred by the statute would be "irreparably" lost.3 9 The
Court also noted that while section 1292 was not directly related to
Cohen's appeal, that statute was evidence that Congress intended to
"allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have
a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties."40
In summarizing its rationale in allowing the immediate appeal,
the Court concluded that Cohen's appeal fell within a "small class [of
non-final orders] which finally determine claims of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated."4 1
Since the inception of the collateral order doctrine in Cohen, the
Court has stressed repeatedly that the overall purpose of the "require-
ments [is to] help qualify for immediate appeal classes of orders in
which the considerations that favor immediate appeals seem compara-
tively strong and those that disfavor such appeals seem comparatively
weak." 42 With such a balance as its motivation, the Court has consist-
ently read and applied the doctrine's requirements narrowly. This
narrow reading underscores the importance of the final judgment
rule and the Court's interest in efficiency and economy within the
federal court system. 43 Although there is value in reading and apply-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 545.
41. Id. at 546.
42. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The [final judgment] rule respects the responsibilities of the trial court by ena-
bling it to perform its function without a court of appeals peering over its shoul-
der every step of the way. It preserves scarce judicial resources that would
otherwise be spent in costly and time-consuming appeals. Trial court errors be-
come moot if the aggrieved party nonetheless obtains a final judgment in his
favor, and appellate courts need not waste time familiarizing themselves anew
with a case each time a partial appeal is taken. Equally important, the final judg-
ment rule removes a potent weapon of harassment and abuse from the hands of
litigants. . . . In many cases in which a claim of right to immediate appeal is
asserted, there is a sympathetic appellant who would undoubtedly gain from an
immediate review of his individual claim. But lurking behind such cases is usually
a vastly larger number of cases in which relaxation of the final judgment rule
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ing the test narrowly, a balance based on such ambiguous criteria as
comparative strength and comparative weakness of considerations
favoring and disfavoring appeals almost certainly produces a test
prone to inconsistent application.
The most oft-cited statement of the test governing application of
the collateral order doctrine stems from the Court's opinion in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,44 a 1978 case where the Court restated
and refined the Cohen requirements into the modern three-part test.
The Livesays, a couple who had purchased securities based on a pro-
spectus that had been certified by the accounting firm of Coopers &
Lybrand and others, brought an action on behalf of themselves and a
similarly situated class claiming that the firm had violated two separate
securities acts. 45 Initially the district court certified the class, but it
later revoked that certification. 46 The Livesays filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeals, which concluded it did have jurisdiction to hear the
immediate appeal and reversed the district court's decertification or-
der.47 Coopers & Lybrand sought review from the United States Su-
preme Court.
The Court first addressed whether the order decertifying the class
constituted a "final judgment," noting that appellate jurisdiction rests
on "the existence of a decision by the District Court that 'ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.' "48 Because a decertification order does not
"of its own force terminate the entire litigation because the plaintiff is
free to proceed on his individual claim," the only basis forjurisdiction
in the pending action was to qualify for an "exception to the final-
judgment rule."49
In holding that the order was not appealable under section 1291,
the Court stated the requirements of the collateral order doctrine: 1)
"the order must conclusively determine the disputed question"; 2) it
would threaten all of the salutary purposes served by the rule. Properly applied,
the collateral order doctrine is necessary to protect litigants in certain narrow
situations. Given the purposes of the final judgment rule, however, we should not
relax its constraints unless we can be certain that all three of the Cohen criteria
are satisfied.
Id. at 543-46.
44. 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (articulating the three-part test of conclusivity, separability,
and effective unreviewability for collateral orders).
45. Id. at 465-66.
46. Id. at 466.
47. Id. at 466-67.
48. Id. at 467 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
49. Id. at 467.
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must "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action"; and 3) it must be "effectively unreviewable" after final
judgment.50
The Court concluded that the decertification order failed each
requirement. First, the order itself was not conclusive because it "is
subject to revision in the District Court."'5' Second, the order was not
sufficiently separable from the underlying action because "class deter-
mination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action.'- 52
The Court noted that the issues involved in determining whether the
decertification was proper were closely connected with the merits of
the plaintiffs underlying claim. For example, to determine whether
the decertification was proper the Court would need to examine the
"typicality of the representative's claims or defenses, the adequacy of
the representative, and the presence of common questions of law or
fact."53 Finally, the order was "effectively reviewable" at final judgment
because it could be raised and remedied by either the plaintiff or in-
tervening class members. 54
The three-part test of conclusivity, separability, and effective un-
reviewability articulated and applied in Coopers & Lybrand has become
the standard for determining jurisdiction based on the collateral or-
der doctrine. 55 The first prong, conclusivity, is illustrated by the
Court's refusal to grant collateral order jurisdiction in a case where
the district court denied a summary judgment motion but expressly
stated it planned to reconsider the motion before sending the case to
the jury.5 6 The "tentative" and "incomplete" nature of the ruling left it
outside the "conclusivity" requirement.
50. Id. at 468.
51. Id. at 469.
52. Id. (quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
53. Id. at 469 n.12 (internal quotation omitted).
54. Id. at 469.
55. Although Coopers & Lybrand provides the test referred to by the Court in its most
recent decisions, it should be noted that the circuit courts of appeals have not uniformly
followed the same test. The inconsistency of collateral order applications within the cir-
cuits is no secret, as the First Circuit pointed out in 1995: "No one can make a seamless web
out of all of the decisions on collateral orders. The circuits are not unanimous in every
nuance, . . . and even within circuits, a wider scope of review may be available for some
interlocutory orders . . . ." United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1995).
56. Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (holding denial of
summary judgment motion not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine
when trial courtjudge planned to reconsider its ruling on the motion before the case went
to the jury).
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The second prong, separability, is illustrated by the Court's re-
fusal to recognize as immediately appealable under the collateral or-
der doctrine an order denying a motion to dismiss first on grounds
that a foreign defendant who had been extradited was immune from
civil process and also on grounds of forum non conveniens.5 7 Key to
the Court's analysis was its determination that the question regarding
the convenience of the forum failed the "separability" requirement of
the collateral order test.58 Citing the importance of avoiding piece-
meal review inherent in the collateral order doctrine, the Court con-
cluded that the decision involved a complex balance that would
require the district court to become "entangled in the merits of the
underlying dispute. '5 9 Because of the "substantial[ ] overlap [of] fac-
tual and legal issues," the order presents a determination that is "un-
suited for immediate appeal . . . under § 1291."60
The third prong of the collateral order analysis, that the order be
"effectively unreviewable" at final judgment, is the most complex of
the three and will be addressed with more specificity in section III.
However, the basic requirement is illustrated by the Court's recogni-
tion of an immediately appealable collateral order in an admiralty
case involving the vacating of an attachment order placed on a foreign
ship. The Court explained that the order dissolving the attachment
was immediately appealable because "[a] ppellate review.., at a later
date would be an empty rite after the vessel had been released and the
restoration of the attachment only theoretically possible."61 The Court
contrasted the unreviewable nature of the order dissolving the attach-
ment with the "reviewable" situation wherein an attachment was up-
held pending the resolution of the principal claim. In that situation,
"the rights of all the parties [could] be adequately protected while the
litigation on the main claim proceed[ed].."62
Civil district court orders qualifying for immediate appeal under
the collateral order doctrine continue to expand as circuit courts ad-
dress and apply the conclusivity, separability, and unreviewability
requirements. 63
57. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1988).
58. Id. at 527.
59. Id. at 528.
60. Id. at 529.
61. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 689
(1950).
62. Id.
63. The circuit courts continue to expand the scope of the collateral order doctrine
in civil cases. For example, in early 2003 the D.C. Circuit held that a defendant in a RICO
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C. Criminal Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine applies in both civil and criminal
contexts. Despite the fact that Cohen itself was a civil case, the doctrine
is based on section 1291, which applies to all "final decisions" of fed-
eral district courts, both civil and criminal. 64 Although there is no
question that the doctrine can apply in criminal actions, the Court has
been reticent to recognize it in the criminal context. To be sure, final-
ity is more strictly scrutinized in criminal cases than it is in civil cases.
As the Court itself has written, "[w] e have interpreted the collateral
order exception 'with the utmost strictness' in criminal cases." 65 This
strict view of finality when analyzing criminal orders is justified by the
fact that "encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the
criminal law."6 6 One of the primary reasons underlying the final judg-
ment rule in criminal cases is the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial, which would be rendered meaningless if all pretrial orders were
appealable-allowing criminal defendants to extend the length of
their trials by numerous intermediate appeals. 67 Society also has an
interest in a speedy trial because "delay may prejudice the prosecu-
tion's ability to prove its case, increase the cost to society of maintain-
ing those defendants subject to pretrial detention, and prolong the
period during which defendants released on bail may commit other
crimes."6 8
Therefore, because of the compelling forces encouraging finality
before allowing criminal appeals, the Court has found only three
criminal pretrial orders to be immediately appealable under the col-
lateral order doctrine, and each involved "'an asserted right the legal
and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindi-
action who wished to challenge a discovery order on the grounds of attorney-client privi-
lege was able to do so under the collateral order doctrine. See United States v. Philip Morris
Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 n.4
(1977).
65. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (citing Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984)).
66. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); see also Abney, 431 U.S. at
657. "Adherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecu-
tions because 'the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,' which the
rule is designed to avoid, 'are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of
the criminal law."' Id. (quoting DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962)).
67. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861 (1978).
68. Id. at 862.
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cated before trial."' 69 Thus, orders involving bail reduction denials,
double jeopardy, and speech or debate clause challenges are immedi-
ately appealable because they are separate from the merits of the un-
derlying criminal charges and because "appellate review must occur
before trial to be fully effective. 70
In its first extension of the collateral order doctrine to criminal
cases, the Court held that denial of a motion to reduce bail is a "final
decision" and immediately appealable under the collateral order doc-
trine.71 The Court based its decision in Stack v. Boyle on the fact that
"there is no discretion to refuse to reduce excessive bail," and as such
the denial constituted the district court's final say on the matter.72 In
applying the rule from Stack, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit articulated more specifically how a denial of a mo-
tion to reduce bail satisfies the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine: "The district court order is final; it is collateral to the issue of
guilt or innocence; it involves a risk of irreparable injury to constitu-
tional rights; and it involves an unsettled question of law which, if not
reviewed, could evade ordinary appellate review."73
Later, despite arguments that applying the collateral order doc-
trine would involve close inspection of the substantive merits of the
case, in Abney v. United States,74 the Court extended the collateral or-
der doctrine to apply to a second category of criminal orders: denials
of motions to dismiss indictments based on claims that retrial would
expose defendants to double jeopardy.75
In its opinion the Court restated the three-part analysis from Co-
hen and determined that denials of motions to dismiss based on
double jeopardy claims satisfied each. First, the Court concluded that
the double jeopardy order was undoubtedly final because it was the
"complete, formal . . . and final rejection" of the claim in the trial
court.76 The Court based the finding of finality on the fact that there
was nothing else the defendant could do at the trial court level to
avoid a trial he believed to be barred by double jeopardy.77 Next, the
69. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982)).
70. Id. at 266.
71. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
72. Id.
73. United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 1986).
74. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
75. Id. at 659.
76. Id.
77. Id.
Winter 2004] COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Court concluded the double jeopardy order was separable from the
underlying criminal charges because "the very nature of a double
jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the
principle issues at the accused's impending criminal trial, i.e., whether
or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged." 78 The Court
noted that the defendant did not contest the underlying charges but
only asserted that retrial would unconstitutionally expose him to
double jeopardy, arguments that the Court found were "completely
independent of his guilt or innocence." 79
Finally, the Court concluded that the denial of the double jeop-
ardy motion would be unreviewable after a full trial because the rights
implicated would be "significantly undermined if appellate review...
were postponed until after conviction and sentence."80 The Constitu-
tion's double jeopardy clause protects the accused from going to trial
at all for the same offense-not merely from double punishment.8'
Thus:
[T]he guarantee's protections would be lost if the accused were
forced to "run the gauntlet" a second time before an appeal could
be taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, has his
conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has
still been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was designed to prohibit. Consequently, if a criminal defendant is
to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full pro-
tection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indict-
ment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure
occurs.
8 2
In reaching this conclusion the Court recognized that its holding
might encourage additional appeals by some defendants, but con-
cluded that "such problems of delay [could] be obviated by rules or
policies giving such appeals expedited treatment" and noted that such
procedures would be within the courts' supervisory powers.8 3
Finally, the Court extended the application of the collateral or-
der doctrine to challenges to district court orders denying motions to
dismiss based on the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution. In Helstoski v. Meanor,8 4 a former member of Congress
78. Id.
79. Id. at 659-60.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 660-61.
82. Id. at 662.
83. Id. at 662 n.8.
84. 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (stating that challenges of validity of indictments on Speech
or Debate Clause grounds are immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine).
[Vol. 38
who was indicted on various counts of conspiracy and bribery raised
the Speech or Debate Clause in his defense because the alleged con-
duct occurred while he was in office and acting within his official ca-
pacity. 85 Although Helstoski sought a writ of mandamus, the Court
held that immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine was
the proper remedy.86 Relying heavily on its reasoning in Abney, the
Court held that the requirements of conclusivity, separability, and ef-
fective unreviewability were satisfied by a Speech or Debate challenge
because the only way a member of Congress could "avoid exposure to
being questioned for acts done in either House and thereby enjoy the
full protection of the Clause [is to] challenge the indictment...
before exposure to trial occurs. 8 7
In all other contexts where parties to criminal proceedings have
attempted to access immediate appeal under the collateral order doc-
trine, those requests have been denied.
II. Emergence of "Important Rights" Analysis in Collateral
Order Opinions
Despite the seemingly concrete nature of the requirements for
gaining immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, courts
have struggled with whether the requirements are an exhaustive list or
whether there is room for additional analysis in the ultimate decision.
The most prominent additional factor considered is the "importance"
of the issue sought to be appealed. The point that the "importance" of
the issue involved in an order that is potentially appealable under the
collateral order doctrine might be significant to the ultimate decision
goes back to the Court's first analysis of whether a non-final order
might be appealed before final judgment.
In Cohen, the Court indicated that the right to security in that
case "present[ed] a serious and unsettled question '8 8 that was part of
a small class of orders "too important to be denied review."'8 9 Later in
its restatement and clarification of the collateral order doctrine's re-
quirements, the Court ruled that the order under consideration must
"resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action."90 The types of interests that have been found to be sufficiently
85. Id. at 501.
86. Id. at 508.
87. Id.
88. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
89. Id. at 546.
90. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
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"important" include: avoiding imprisonment under the Excessive Bail
Clause; avoiding trial under the Double Jeopardy Clause; avoiding
trial under the Speech or Debate Clause; and avoiding trial under
Eleventh Amendment immunity.9 1
When deciding whether an order qualifies for immediate appeal
under the collateral order doctrine, analysis of "importance" is both
implicit and explicit in the Court's collateral order jurisprudence.
From the doctrine's creation until the decisions of the 1980s, the anal-
ysis was merely implied in the Court's opinions. For example, the anal-
ysis in the majority opinion in Abney indicates that the Court is willing
to relax some of the scrutiny involved in analyzing the traditional
three-prong test of conclusivity, separability, and effective un-
reviewability if the right involved was sufficiently "important."9 2 Due to
its very nature, review of a denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of
double jeopardy necessarily involves analysis of the merits of the
case-something seemingly prohibited by the separability prong of
the traditional collateral order test-but the Court concluded that
such orders satisfy the collateral order doctrine. The explanation for
this result must be that the Court concluded that the rights guaran-
teed by the Constitutional protection against double jeopardy were
"important" enough to downplay the connection between the subject
of the "collateral order" and the merits of the case, although the
Court fails to state so specifically.
Later, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,93 the case recognizing absolute presi-
dential immunity as appealable under the collateral order doctrine,
the Court referred specifically to the "importance" of claims alleging a
breach of Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers,
implying that the importance of the interests involved is relevant to
whether the order qualifies under the collateral order doctrine.
The most common way the Court implies that "importance" is
relevant to collateral order rulings is through the language used in
articulating the test itself. For example, in Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the
Court states the second requirement as a "ruling [that] resolves an
91. While it is true that this list of orders includes only those involving constitutional
protections, the Court has not gone as far as making that a touchstone for "importance";
rather, the Court has used constitutional or statutory basis as an indicator of "importance."
See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994) ("When a
policy is embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision entitling a party to immunity
from suit (a rare form of protection), there is little room for the judiciary to gainsay its
'importance."' (citations omitted, alteration in original)).
92. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658-62 (1977).
93. 457 U.S. 731 (1977).
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important issue completely separate from the merits. '9 4 Athough the
Court does not go on to discuss how the order involved does or does
not qualify as "important"-focusing instead on the separability ele-
ment encompassed in the prong of the test-it is reasonable to con-
clude that the answer to that query does factor into the Court's
ultimate conclusions.
Another way the Court slips "importance" analysis into its reason-
ing is by commenting on the "importance" of the rights affected by
the underlying order. For example, in United States v. MacDonald,9 5 the
Court explained:
Admittedly, there is value-to all but the most unusual litigant-in
triumphing before trial, rather than after it, regardless of the sub-
stance of the winning claim. But this truism is not to be confused
with the quite distinct proposition that certain claims (because of
the substance of the rights entailed, rather than the advantage to a
litigant in winning his claim sooner) should be resolved before
trial. Double jeopardy claims are paradigmatic.9 6
The transition from implicit to explicit consideration of "impor-
tance" seems to come in a pair of concurring opinions authored by
Justice Scalia in the late 1980s. Although absent from the majority's
opinion, in his concurrence in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., 97Justice Scalia noted that the Court's decision could be alterna-
tively supported by what he referred to as "the rule adopted by the
First Circuit"98 requiring "an important and unsettled question of con-
trolling law, not merely a question of the proper exercise of the trial
court's discretion" as a prerequisite for collateral order jurisdiction. 99
He then asserted that the "importance" approach "has some support"
in the Court's earlier opinions creating and interpreting the collateral
order doctrine.100 He cited both Cohen itself and Coopers & Lybrand to
support the contention, finally asserting that while the Court could
not formally adopt the analysis without full "adversarial exploration,"
he personally believed that "our finality jurisprudence is sorely in
94. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting Coopers &
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 (1978)).
95. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
96. Id. at 860 n.7.
97. 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
98. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that "separa-
bility, finality, urgency, and importance"-the policy and logic of the collateral order deci-
sions-"suggest that the possibility of irreparable harm resulting from a delay in appellate
review is the dispositive criterion of interlocutory appealability.").
99. Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 291-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
100. Id. at 292.
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need of further limiting principles, so that Cohen appeals will be, as we
originally announced they would be, a 'small class [of decisions] ...
too important to be denied review."1 01
Just one year after writing that "importance" analysis had "some
support" in the Court's collateral order decisions, Justice Scalia
strengthened its standing by asserting that "the importance of the
right asserted has always been a significant part of [the Court's] collat-
eral order doctrine."'1 2 In his concurrence in Lauro Lines S.RL. v.
Chasser, Justice Scalia wrote to make explicit what he viewed was "im-
plicit in the [Court's] analysis"-that the reason why the order at is-
sue, the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the contractual forum
selection clause, did not qualify for immediate appeal was because
"the law does not deem the right important enough."' 03 After summa-
rizing the Court's use of "importance" in earlier cases, Justice Scalia
opined that although the right asserted would be "positively de-
stroyed" absent the immediate appeal, the right to seek a reversal after
trial was "vindication enough because the right is not sufficiently im-
portant to overcome the policies militating against interlocutory
appeals."'104
After this concurrence, the Court's consideration of "impor-
tance" in its collateral order decisions becomes more explicit, whether
the analysis is embodied in majority or additional opinions.
In Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc.,105 the Court employed "importance" analysis as it held that deni-
als of Eleventh Amendment immunity qualified for appeal under the
collateral order doctrine. In addition to its analysis of the three stan-
dard requirements, the Court emphasized that "a motion by a State or
its agents to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds involves a claim
to a fundamental constitutional protection .... ,1106 The Court then
concluded that "[w] hile application of the collateral order doctrine in
this type of case is justified in part by a concern that States not be
unduly burdened by litigation, its ultimate justification is the impor-
tance of ensuring that the States' dignitary interests can be fully
vindicated."' 0 7
101. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
102. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 502-03.
105. 506 U.S. 139 (1993).
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id. at 146.
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The most explicit use of "importance" analysis in determining
whether an order qualifies as an appealable collateral order is found
in the Court's unanimous opinion in Digital Equipment Cop. v. Desktop
Direct, Inc.108 However, the Court approached the issue a bit differ-
ently as it concluded that the importance of the question to be re-
solved is a factor in determining whether an issue is "effectively
unreviewable" at final judgment. In stating the collateral order test,
the Court repeated the word "important" in a way it had not before:
"those district court decisions that are conclusive, that resolve impor-
tant questions completely separate from the merits, and that would
render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal
from final judgment in the underlying action."'0 9 .
In Digital Equipment Corp., the parties were involved in a trade-
mark infringement action over the use of a trade name.' 10 The parties
entered into a settlement agreement regarding the use of the name,
agreed to waive damages, and filed for dismissal in the district
court."1 Later the plaintiff changed its mind and filed a motion to
vacate the dismissal and rescind the settlement agreement, which the
district court granted. An appeal to the Court of Appeals for Tenth
Circuit followed, but the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not-
ing the absence of a final judgment under section 1291.112 The court
of appeals applied the three requirements of the collateral order doc-
trine and concluded that the benefits gained under the settlement
agreement were not sufficiently "important" to qualify for immediate
appeal.1 13
Although it subtly questioned the Tenth Circuit's conclusions
about the conclusivity and separability of the order, the Court af-
firmed the decision based on its conclusion that the order involved
failed "to meet the third condition of the Cohen test, that the decision
on an 'important' question be 'effectively unreviewable' upon final
judgment." 1 4 The right given by a contractual agreement providing
immunity from trial "does not rise to the level of importance needed
for recognition under § 1291."115
108. 511 U.S. 863 (1994).
109. Id. at 867.
110. See id. at 865-66.
111. See id. at 866.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 869.
115. Id. at 878.
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The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that the "impor-
tance" analysis that figured prominently in the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion was not the proper basis for the decision, and that the Court had
never found an otherwise appealable order unappealable due to
"unimportance." Instead, the Court reasoned that "if 'importance'
were truly aberrational, we would not find it featured so prominently
in the Cohen opinion itself, which describes the 'small class' of imme-
diately appealable prejudgment decisions in terms of rights that are
'too important to be denied review' right away."' 16 Further, the Court
noted that whether "importance" is a separate requirement or merely
a part of the second factor-separability-"neither enquiry could lead
to the conclusion that 'importance' is itself unimportant."'1 17 Instead,
the Court concluded that the requirement of effective unreviewability
"simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of
the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final
judgment requirement."' 1 8
The Court then examined the importance of a right granted by a
private contractual agreement. Although it declined to rule on the
importance of all contractual rights, the Court did contrast contrac-
tual rights with rights guaranteed by the Constitution or other
statutes:
When a policy is embodied in a constitutional or statutory provi-
sion entitling a party to immunity from suit (a rare form of protec-
tion), there is little room for the judiciary to gainsay its
"importance." Including a provision in a private contract, by con-
trast, is barely a prima facie indication that the right secured is
"important" . .. or that it qualifies as 'important' in Cohen's sense,
as being weightier than the societal interests advanced by the ordi-
nary operation of final judgment principles. 119
Unfortunately, the Court undermined the clarity of the role of impor-
tance in its decision by stating that even if "importance" analysis were
removed from collateral order analysis, the decision in the case would
not change.' 2 0
Despite the unanimous opinion in Digital Equipment Corp., as "im-
portance" continued to become a more explicit part of the Court's
analysis of collateral order doctrine, it is apparent that the Justices
differed in their interpretation of what it means to be "important" and
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 878-79.
119. Id. at 879.
120. See id. at 881.
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how an issue's "importance" impacts the ultimate decision under the
collateral order doctrine.
In Behrens v. Pelletier,121 the majority and the dissent agreed that
the issue involved in the order under consideration-a denial of sum-
mary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity-is "important"
enough to warrant collateral order review. However, they disagreed as
to the ultimate effect of that "importance" in a situation where the
question is whether multiple appeals of later discovery orders are like-
wise permitted. In other words, as Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
explained, the majority and the dissent disagreed as to whether the
purpose of "importance" analysis was 1) to determine the level of im-
portance to the appellant, which could be encompassed in the third
requirement of effective unreviewability; 2) to determine the level of
importance to "the world at large, [in which case] it is a curious condi-
tion to engraft onto a right to appeal"; or 3) to determine the level of
importance "merely to make sure that the irreparable harm cross
some minimum threshold of severity, since a harm could be at once
irreparable and slight and if so it would not warrant a departure from
the final decision rule."1 22
Writing for the majority in Behrens, Justice Scalia explained the
rationale that the "important right" involved was not only the right to
avoid trial when protected by qualified immunity but also the right to
avoid the "burdens" of such things as pretrial discovery when they are
extinguished by qualified immunity. 23 This position seems to retreat
from the value Justice Scalia placed on "importance" in both Gu/f
stream and Lauro Lines.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent supporting the application of the col-
lateral order doctrine but limiting it to a single appeal, described "im-
portance" as a qualification for appeal as a collateral order, stating
that the "interest being asserted must be an important one."124 He
stated further that "the importance of the interest (an interlocutory ap-
peal is needed to protect) is one necessary requirement for applica-
tion of the technical labels 'final' or 'collateral order.""' 25 Justice
Breyer asserted that avoiding discovery (after the use of a single pre-
trial appeal to determine whether a denial to avoid trial based on a
qualified immunity assertion) is not "sufficiently important" to war-
121. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
122. Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306.
124. Id. at 317 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 324.
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rant additional appeals. 26 Thus, despite the common inclusion of
"importance" in the analysis of the collateral order doctrine, the
Court itself is inconsistent in both its analysis and its application.
This inconsistency in the opinions of the Court has led the lower
courts to increasingly incongruent formulations of the collateral order
doctrine requirements and the role "importance" plays in such deci-
sions. For example, the Circuit for the District of Columbia relies on
statements from the Third Circuit that define the second prong of the
collateral order doctrine (separability) as having two parts-separabil-
ity and importance. 127 In defining the criteria for "importance," the
court explained, "for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is impor-
tant if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without im-
mediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the
efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final
judgment rule." 128 The D.C. Circuit further bases its interpretation on
the statement from Digital Equipment Corp. that "'[i] mportant' as the
Supreme Court has explained, '[means] being weightier than the so-
cietal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment
principles.' "129
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit in its 2003 opinion in Under Seal v.
Under Seal 30 disputes the inclusion of "importance" analysis at all in
collateral order decisions.' 31
Since Cohen, the Court has described and/or applied the collat-
eral order analysis at least twenty-nine times in majority opinions.13 2
In all but one, the Court used the three Cohen factors.1 33 Only once, in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, did the Court include a fourth factor. 134 In other
cases when the Court has referred to the "serious and unsettled" fac-
tor, it attributed the "factor" to the circuit court, implying that the
factor was applied by the circuit court but not that the Court itself
required consideration of such.13 5
126. Id. at 317.
127. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879
(1994)).
130. 326 F.3d 479, 481 (4th Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 481 (rejecting the requirement that a case "present a serious and unsettled
question on appeal" as a "fourth factor" to the collateral order analysis).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 482.
135. See id.
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Thus, despite evidence of "importance" analysis in the Court's
opinions dating back to Cohen and most explicitly in Digital Equipment
Corp., the lower courts lack a coherent and consistent understanding
of the role such analysis should play in determining an order's appeal-
ability under the collateral order doctrine.
III. The Unreviewability Requirement
The collateral order requirement that has been the subject of the
most inconsistency during the sixty years of its existence is the require-
ment that the order being appealed be "effectively unreviewable" at
final judgment. Scholars Wright and Miller summarize this require-
ment as a two-part test requiring both the risk that the order will
evade review on appeal from a final judgment and the risk of signifi-
cant hardship caused by such lack of review. 13 6 In reality, however, the
Court has not uniformly or even consistently analyzed what it means
to be "unreviewable."
Instead, the Court's opinions seem to employ two different meth-
ods of analysis under which the order is "unreviewable," with the pri-
mary difference being the object of the inquiry-either the party to
the litigation or the rights involved. First, several opinions suggest that
to be "unreviewable" at final judgment an order must cause "signifi-
cant," "permanent," "irreparable," or "irreversible" harm to a party.
Second, other opinions focus on the rights involved, rather than on
the parties themselves, and suggest that "unreviewability" requires that
those rights be "irretrievably lost" absent immediate appeal. It should
be noted at the outset that the two lines of reasoning are not mutually
exclusive and that the Court has used both as the basis for decisions in
the same case. They do, however, involve very different analysis and
rely on discrete rationale.
A. Significant, Permanent, Irreparable, or Irreversible Harm
The first line of analysis the Court employs when determining
whether an order is "effectively unreviewable" and thereby qualifies
for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine focuses on
the harm to the individual involved: the party who is seeking the ap-
peal. Under this analysis, the Court finds the possibility of "irreparable
injury" absent immediate review sufficient to satisfy the collateral or-
der requirement. Thus, the requirement that an issue be effectively
136. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911.3 (2d ed. 1992).
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unreviewable later on means that lack of immediate review may result
in significant harm. 137 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, citing to Cohen
and the collateral order doctrine as support for his contention,
opined in his concurrence in Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Mackey' 38 that "the
Court has permitted appeal before completion of the whole litigation
when failure to do so would preclude any effective review or would
result in irreparable injury."139 Therefore, this analysis focuses on the
actual harm to the parties involved by concluding that an order is ef-
fectively unreviewable "when the practical effect of the order will be
irreparable by any subsequent appeal.' 140
The Court's focus on harm suffered by the parties is further illus-
trated by its explanation for why the constitutional right to a speedy
trial fails to qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order
doctrine. Distinguishing the right to a speedy trial from the guarantee
to avoid double jeopardy, the Court explained that the right to a
speedy trial is not the kind of right that "must be upheld prior to trial
if it is to be enjoyed at all."'141 Failure to review speedy trial claims
before final judgment "does not cause or compound the deprivation
already suffered."' 42 In other words, the party seeking review does not
suffer additional "harm" from having to wait to appeal. Therefore, not
only must the harm be suffered, it must be the type of harm that could
be averted by immediate appeal because "It]he 'effective un-
reviewability' requirement means that failure to review the order on
appeal now may cause a litigant permanent harm."'143
Some of the Court's decisions seem to imply that "irreparable
harm" by itself can provide the basis for jurisdiction under the collat-
eral order doctrine. The need for finality should "'be construed so as
not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irrepa-
rable injuries to be suffered.'1 44 Thus, a refusal to disqualify counsel
does not cause irreparable harm of the kind envisioned and as such is
not qualified to immediate review.' 45 Further, even if the situation
arose where a party is irreparably harmed by inability to appeal an
137. SeeJohnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995).
138. 351 U.S. 427 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This is a case that does not
directly implicate the collateral order doctrine but does address "premature" appeals.
139. Id. at 441.
140. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962).
141. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861 (1978).
142. Id.
143. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 315 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (citation
omitted).
145. See id. at 377.
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order denying a motion to disqualify counsel, that instance would be
so rare that it does not warrant the "[creation of] a general rule per-
mitting the appeal of all such orders.' 46 Therefore, under this
method of analysis, not only must the actual party suffer harm, but
that harm also must be characteristic of all similarly situated parties.
Several courts of appeals have adopted this rationale and tailored
their focus to the potential harm suffered absent immediate appeal.
The First Circuit articulated more explicitly the possibility of "irrepa-
rable harm" as the basis for immediate analysis when it reasoned that
the policy and logic of the collateral order decisions "suggest that the
possibility of irreparable harm resulting from a delay in appellate re-
view is the dispositive criterion of interlocutory appealability.' 47
The Seventh Circuit recognized the role of "irreparable harm" in
determinations of unreviewability under the collateral order doctrine
because it seized on a suggestion in Cohen itself that "the purpose of
the collateral-order doctrine is closely related to that of section
1292(a) (1), which allows immediate appeal of an order granting or
denying a preliminary injunction because an erroneous such order
must, virtually by definition, cause irreparable harm to one of the par-
ties."148 Thus, "[f] or an order to be appealable under the Cohen doc-
trine its consequences for the appellant must be irreversible by
subsequent proceedings."'149 This formulation identifies the "unifying
theme to the complex rules governing the appeal of interlocutory or-
ders within the federal system.., that such orders are appealable only
when they threaten irreparable harm.' 50
The "conclusivity" and "unreviewability" requirements are closely
related because if the order at issue is not conclusive or "definitive"
then "an immediate appeal is not necessary to ward off harm; there is
146. Id. at 378 n.13. It should be noted, however, that the Court suggested that inter-
locutory appeal under section 1292(b) would be an appropriate remedy in such a situa-
tion. Since section 1292(b) applies only in civil cases, resting the definition of
"unreviewability" on such analysis would harm parties in criminal proceedings.
147. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980); see also Irons v. FBI, 811
F.2d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he fact that the right asserted is, like this one, essen-
tially incapable of vindication if the aggrieved party must await an appeal from final judg-
ment, 'should be the 'central focus' and perhaps even the 'dispositive criterion' of
appellate jurisdiction over [interlocutory] orders.' Here, irreparable harm would plainly
result to the appellants from an inability to obtain precompliance review.") (second altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted).
148. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1984).
149. Id. at 1118.
150. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
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no harm yet."15 1 Further, the party seeking the appeal need not actu-
ally suffer harm; instead, a showing that there is "a danger" that irrep-
arable harm will occur absent immediate appeal is sufficient to satisfy
the "unreviewability" requirement. 52 This was precisely the situation
in Cohen itself, where there was simply the danger that "the fees would
disappear into insolvent hands."15 3
Finally, the Seventh Circuit suggests that if irreparable harm is
part of the determination then likelihood of success on the appeal
should also factor into the equation. If likelihood of success is low
then there is very little for the appellant to lose if the appeal is not
heard immediately. 154 However, this interpretation seems at odds with
the Supreme Court's decision in Stringellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action,' 55 where the Court held that an order granting permissive in-
tervention but not intervention by right is not "effectively unreview-
able" because the intervenor's rights will not be "irretrievably lost in
the absence of an immediate appeal."' 56 There the Court rejected the
argument that the party would suffer harm because the likelihood of
prevailing on an appeal after finaljudgment was slight and should not
affect the analysis of whether the order qualified for immediate re-
view. "Although it may be difficult for [the intervenor] to show that
the harm from the intervention order is sufficiently great to overturn
the final judgment, this has little bearing on whether [the intervenor]
has the right to an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order
doctrine."1 5 7
Again, the common rationale throughout these opinions is that
"unreviewability" is measured by the degree of harm parties would be
forced to suffer without the ability to immediately appeal orders
before final judgment.
B. Rights That Would Be Irretrievably Lost
The second line of "unreviewability" analysis focuses on the right
asserted and how it could be lost or destroyed if appeal is not granted
rather than on the harm the individual might suffer. The foundation
for this analysis is found in the Cohen opinion recognizing immedi-
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1319.
153. Id.
154. Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1996).
155. 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
156. Id. at 376-77.
157. Id.
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ately appealable collateral orders. There the Court acknowledged that
"[w] hen the time comes [for a final judgment], it will be too late ef-
fectively to review the present order and the rights conferred by the
statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably."158
In subsequent cases invoking the doctrine, the Court repeated its fo-
cus on rights as the basis for "unreviewability" stating that "[t]he col-
lateral order doctrine ['s] . . . reach is limited to trial court orders
affecting rights that would be irretrievably lost in the absence of an
immediate appeal . .. " 159Additionally, an order is effectively unre-
viewable if it "involves an asserted right the legal and practical value of
which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial. ' 160
Finally, determinations of "unreviewability" for collateral order pur-
poses look to "whether the right affected by the ruling can and should
be protected by appeal prior to judgment" in contrast to looking at
the expenses that would be imposed by a "possibly erroneous
ruling."161
Thus, under this line of "unreviewability" analysis, enabling par-
ties to receive protection guaranteed by important rights is central to
appealability. For example, in Helstoski v. Meanor,162 wherein the Court
held that orders denying immunity under the Speech or Debate
Clause are appealable collateral orders, the Court recognized that "if
a Member 'is to avoid exposure to [being questioned for acts done in
either House] and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his
... challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before . . . expo-
sure [to trial] occurs.' 163
158. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
159. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (citation omitted).
160. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989); see also Van
Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 524 (1988) ("[T]he final judgment rule requires
that except in certain narrow circumstances in which the right would be 'irretrievably lost'
absent an immediate appeal, . . . litigants must abide by the district court's judgments, and
suffer the concomitant burden of a trial, until the end of proceedings before gaining ap-
pellate review.") (citation omitted).
161. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 436.
162. 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (holding that challenges of validity of indictments on Speech
or Debate Clause grounds are immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine).
163. Id. at 508 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (alterations in
original)); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985):
The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;
and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permit-
ted to go to trial. Accordingly, the reasoning that underlies the immediate appeal-
ability of an order denying absolute immunity indicates to us that the denial of
qualified immunity should be similarly appealable: in each case, the district
court's decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
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Some of the Court's opinions seem to require that the asserted
right that might be irretrievably lost be a "right not to be tried." When
denying to grant collateral order status to a speedy trial claim the
Court reasoned that "[t]he nature of the speedy trial right was such
that '[p]roceeding with the trial does not cause or compound the
deprivation already suffered.' "1 64 The Court then made a "crucial dis-
tinction between a right not to be tried and a right whose remedy
requires the dismissal of charges .... The former necessarily falls into
the category of rights that can be enjoyed only if vindicated prior to
trial. The latter does not."1 65 In Midland Asphalt v. United States,166 the
Court rejected petitioner's argument that even if the order at issue
would be "theoretically reviewable" after trial it would be "effectively
unreviewable."' 6 7 The Court based its conclusion on its view that the
right merely not to be convicted is not the same as the "right not to be
tried at all."168 Anticipating future cases where creative lawyers would
attempt to craft nearly any right into a "right not to be tried," the
Court clarified its reasoning by explaining that while, "[i] n one sense,
any legal rule can be said to give rise to a 'right not to be tried' if
failure to observe it requires the trial court to dismiss the indictment
or terminate the trial . . . that is assuredly not the sense relevant for
purposes of the exception to the final judgment rule."'169 Instead, "[a]
right not to be tried in the sense relevant to the Cohen exception rests
upon an explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will
not occur-as in the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . or the Speech or
Debate Clause .... "170
However, despite these opinions, the Court has continually em-
phasized that a party's ability to characterize the right affected should
not be the determining factor in deciding collateral order
jurisdiction:
Even as [our cases] have recognized the need for immediate ap-
peals under § 1291 to vindicate rights that would be "irretrievably
lost" if review were confined to final judgments only, our cases have
been at least as emphatic in recognizing that the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals should not, and cannot, depend on a party's agil-
ity in so characterizing the right asserted. This must be so because
164. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 269 (1982) (citation
omitted).
165. Id.
166. 489 U.S. 794 (1989).
167. Id. at 800.
168. Id. at 801.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
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the strong bias of § 1291 against piecemeal appeals almost never
operates without some cost .... [A]lmost every pretrial or trial or-
der might be called "effectively unreviewable" in the sense that re-
lief from error can never extend to rewriting history. 17
1
In addition, unlike some circuit courts that have found the possibility
of "irreparable harm" dispositive in collateral order decisions, when
adopting the "rights" line of analysis the Court has maintained that
the "mere identification of some interest that would be 'irretrievably
lost"' is not sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the Cohen test. 172
Instead the right must be of the kind where its protection is more
important than the costs associated with an appeal in advance of final
judgment.173
As they have with the line of analysis focusing on irreparable
harm to parties, the circuit courts of appeal have adopted and applied
the irretrievable loss analysis. The most consistent application of this
analysis is found in cases involving privacy rights, privilege, or other
matters of personal liberty. For example, the First Circuit held an or-
der unsealing private financial statements is appealable under the col-
lateral doctrine because "[t]he privacy right to which the appellants
lay claim must be vindicated now, or it will be forever lost. '174
The Seventh Circuit has applied irretrievable loss analysis to
rights protecting confidentiality and privilege. In United States v. Dorf-
man,1 75 the Seventh Circuit granted immediate appeal to criminal de-
fendants who challenged an order unsealing wiretap transcripts on
the ground that the publication of the transcripts would invade de-
fendants' right of privacy. The court explained this was so because
the defendants' privacy would be "gone forever as soon as the media
began disseminating their news stories; and it is doubtful, to put it
mildly, that if the appellants ultimately convinced this court or the
Supreme Court that the motion had been improperly granted, they
could get any monetary redress. 1 7 6 In other words, the defendants'
privacy rights would have been irretrievably lost absent immediate ap-
peal. 177 The Seventh Circuit then distinguished its ruling from possi-
ble appeals based on a defendant's fair trial rights. The court
explained that had the appeal been grounded on the contention that
171. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 871-72 (1994).
172. Id. at 872.
173. This analysis gets intertwined with the Court's analysis of "importance." See supra
Part II.
174. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1987).
175. 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982).
176. Id. at 1232.
177. See id.
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public disclosure of the transcript would prevent a fair trial, "[n]ot
only could such an appeal delay the trial, but the appellants, though
not the media, could look forward to having an effective remedy if it
turned out that the motion had been granted improperly-an order
for a new trial."' 178
The Sixth Circuit allowed immediate appeal of an order commit-
ting a criminal defendant for forty-five days to undergo psychiatric ex-
aminations in an attempt to determine competence because there
could be no effective remedy by later appeal for the loss of liberty and
the forced intrusion of the exam.179 In reaching the same conclusion
on a similar order, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "[a]s in the denial
of bail, if the appeal is not allowed there can be no remedy for the
resulting loss of liberty .... A defendant must not be left without re-
course to appellate review where there is an immediate and significant
loss of personal liberty."'180
Although the two lines of analysis governing application of the
"unreviewability" requirement in the collateral order doctrine are not
necessarily incompatible, the Court's failure to explain precisely
whether either alternative is acceptable or the circumstances in which
each line is preferred or even necessary, leads to a legal rule that is
less than clear for application in future cases. The lack of such clear
direction and the problems it creates for litigants, trial courts, and
appellate courts is clear upon examination of the Court's most recent
explanation of the collateral order doctrine in Sell v. United States.'8'
IV. Illustration and Analysis of the Involuntary Medication
Cases and the Court's Failure to Reach an Effective
Resolution in Sell v. United States Using the
Collateral Order Doctrine
Prior to the Court's decision in Sell, the secure markers in the
Court's earlier cases made the analysis of appellate jurisdiction in
cases involving orders authorizing the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication in attempts to restore a pretrial criminal de-
fendant's competence to stand trial seemingly straightforward. Al-
though the Court's opinion in Sell supports the conclusion of each
lower court addressing the issue, it further complicates the collateral
178. Id.
179. See United States v. Davis 93 F.3d 1286, 1288-89 (6th Cir. 1996).
180. United States v. Boigegrain, 122 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997).
181. 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
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order doctrine by slightly changing the requirements for appellate ju-
risdiction under that doctrine.
This section will review the circuit courts' resolution of jurisdic-
tion in involuntary medication cases. It will next examine the Court's
decision in Sell and argue that the decision imprudently expands and
further complicates appellate court jurisdiction under the collateral
order doctrine-something unnecessary to award jurisdiction in the
case. It will then turn to the dissent in Sell and argue that the positions
advocated therein constitute a narrow and inconsistent approach to
jurisdiction under the doctrine. Finally, the section will offer a recom-
mendation of a ruling that would have been in line with prior collat-
eral order jurisprudence without unnecessarily expanding its narrow
scope and yet still supporting the policies underlying the final judg-
ment rule.
A. Background: The Circuit Courts' Resolution of Jurisdiction in
Involuntary Medication Cases
Five different circuit courts of appeal have addressed their juris-
diction to review involuntary medication orders in criminal cases.
Three of these courts have expressly considered the requirements of
the collateral order doctrine, uniformly concluding that such orders
qualify for immediate appeal. The other two circuits exercised juris-
diction on such appeals without expressly addressing the basis for
their jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Brandon,182 the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Morgan,183 and the Second Circuit in United States v.
Gomes184 each concluded that district court orders involving the pre-
trial involuntary medication of criminal defendants in attempt to re-
store competence satisfy the requirements for immediate appeal
under the collateral order doctrine. The district court orders involved
in Morgan and Gomes directly authorized the administration of medica-
tion to the defendants.18 5 However, Brandon involved a district court's
denial of a motion to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the
propriety of involuntary medication in an attempt to make the crimi-
nal defendant competent to stand trial.186 Despite the technical differ-
182. 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998).
183. 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999).
184. 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002).
185. See Morgan, 193 F.3d at 258; Gomes, 289 F.3d at 78.
186. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 950. Thus, the order in Brandon differs from some of the
other involuntary medication appeals because the issue is whether a judicial hearing is
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ence in the type of order involved, the analysis of the courts was
remarkably similar.
Before reaching the merits of the decision, each court acknowl-
edged that it would only have jurisdiction if the order fell within the
scope of Cohen's collateral order doctrine. 187 Brandon was the only
case where the government argued that the district court's order did
not fall within the narrow confines of the doctrine and, as such, was
not properly appealable before final judgment on the underlying
criminal charges.1 88 In each of the other cases the parties agreed that
jurisdiction was proper. However, as the Second Circuit acknowl-
edged, 'jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties" and, as such,
"we must independently decide the question."18 9
After acknowledging the role of the collateral order doctrine in
appellate jurisdiction, each court analyzed and explained how the or-
der at hand satisfied each of the doctrine's three requirements. First,
each court held that the issue was "conclusively decided." Two of the
decisions address specifically how the orders involved satisfy conclusiv-
ity. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because the district court's deci-
sion that additional procedural safeguards were not required before a
decision about involuntary medication was made, the issue was not
subject to further consideration by the court. 190 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the district court's failure to indicate intent to "revisit
this ruling before the medication is administered" satisfied the con-
clusivity requirement. 91
Second, each court concluded that the order was separate from
the underlying criminal charges. 19 2 None of the three circuits offered
extended explanation of this requirement; rather, all three stated
summarily that the medication order was clearly separate from the
charges on which the defendants had been indicted. The most exten-
sive rationale offered was that of the Fourth Circuit, which reasoned
that its "determination of whether [defendant] has received the pro-
cedural safeguards to which he is entitled before being forcibly medi-
required to protect a defendant's due process rights rather the companion issue of
whether the medication order itself violates due process.
187. See id. at 951; Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259; Gomes, 289 F.3d at 79.
188. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 950.
189. Comes, 289 F.3d at 79.
190. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 951.
191. Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259.
192. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 951; Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259; Comes, 289 F.3d at 79.
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cated will have no bearing upon the ultimate question of whether he
is guilty or not guilty of those offenses."1 9 3
Third, each court concluded that the district court's order would
be "effectively unreviewable on appeal after a final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal trial."1 94 The rationale for these conclusions
focus on the possibility that the defendants' rights could be irretriev-
ably lost absent immediate appeal. As the Sixth Circuit stated, "be-
cause the order relates to the administration of drugs in order to
restore [defendant's] competency to stand trial, it would be of little
value to [him] for this court to review his due-process claim after he
has been forcibly medicated and the trial has concluded. ' 195 Similarly,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "[o]nce [defendant] has been forci-
bly medicated pursuant to the order, a determination of the procedu-
ral safeguards to which he was entitled prior thereto would amount to
a purely academic exercise. 1 9 6 Finally, the Second Circuit concluded
that "the district court's order is effectively unreviewable on appeal. If
the defendant should prevail after he has been forcibly medicated, his
right to refuse to be medicated would have been lost and his victory
would be a hollow one."197 Based on these conclusions, each circuit
held that the order qualified for immediate appeal under the collat-
eral order doctrine.
Two additional circuits have exercised jurisdiction on pretrial in-
voluntary medication orders. The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Wes-
ton'98 exercised jurisdiction over a pretrial involuntary medication
order without specific discussion of the application of the collateral
order doctrine. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit failed to address or even
mention the issue of its jurisdiction in United States v. Sell.'99 Its exer-
cise ofjurisdiction to review the involuntary medication order before
it implies its conclusion that such an order qualifies for review under
the collateral order doctrine.
193. Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259.
194. Brandon, 158 F.3d at 951; see also Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259; Comes, 289 F.3d at 79.
195. Brandon, 158 F.3d at 951.
196. Morgan, 193 F.3d at 259.
197. Comes, 289 F.3d at 79.
198. 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
199. 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
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B. The Court's Decision in Sell v. United States: A Broadening of
the Scope for the Collateral Order Doctrine
In June 2003, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Sell v.
United States,20 0 vacating the lower court's decision and remanding the
case for further consideration-in effect saying that the government
had not proved sufficiently that medication was warranted in Sell's
situation. Although it ultimately agreed with each of the lower courts
that had previously found involuntary medication orders appealable,
the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, impru-
dently expanded and further complicated appellate court jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine.
Before addressing the merits of the due process, fair trial, and
First Amendment challenges brought by the defendant, the Court ex-
amined the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction over the district court's pre-
trial order affirming an involuntary medication order issued by a
magistrate. 20 In so doing, the Court summarized the governing prin-
ciples of the collateral order doctrine: "a preliminary or interim deci-
sion is appealable as a 'collateral order' when it (1) 'conclusively
determine s] the disputed question,' (2) 'resolve[s] an important is-
sue completely separate from the merits of the action,' and (3) is 'ef-
fectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.' 20 2 Applying
these principles in a shallow discussion barely exceeding one page of
the opinion, the Court held that "this District Court order does ap-
pear to fall within the 'collateral order' exception." 203 On the surface
the Court's conclusion is unremarkable-seemingly applying and
reaching a conclusion consistent with its previous interpretations of
the collateral order doctrine. However, on closer examination the
Court's analysis begins to appear less than consistent and even contra-
dictory of earlier iterations of the doctrine.
Without supporting its determination with any explanation, the
Court concluded that the involuntary medication order satisfies the
"conclusivity" requirement because the order "'conclusively deter-
mines the disputed question,' namely, whether Sell has a legal right to
avoid forced medication." 20 4 The superficial nature of this discussion
200. 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
201. See id. at 2181-83.
202. Id. at 2182 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978))
(alterations in original).
203. Id. at 2182.
204. Id. at 2177 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468).
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is, unfortunately, not inconsistent with earlier collateral order opin-
ions. With regard to Sell's challenge based on substantive due process
rights and any residual First Amendment rights that are not coexten-
sive with due process, the Court's determination of conclusivity is con-
sistent with its earlier application of the requirement. What the Court
overlooks, however, is that the district court had not issued a conclu-
sive determination on the issue involving Sell's right to a fair trial.
Instead, the district court had expressly stated it would be necessary to
continually reassess fair trial issues because a final determination of
the affect of involuntary medication on those rights was "premature,"
as the effects such medication would have on Sell were merely specu-
lative until the medication was actually administered.20 5 By ignoring
the preliminary nature of at least one part of the district court's order,
the Court has undermined the "conclusivity" requirement of the col-
lateral order doctrine and has opened the possibility that other non-
conclusive orders may become appealable, thereby diluting the final
judgment rule.
Its loosening of the "conclusivity" requirement is not the only
area where the Court inserted further inconsistency and perhaps even
confusion into an already inconsistent rule. Confusion creeps into its
"separability" analysis as well. Here, the potential inconsistency and
confusion is not found as much in the application of the rule to the
facts of Sell's case as it is in the articulation of the rule itself. Seem-
ingly adopting the views of the Third and D.C. Circuits, 20 6 the Court
divided the second requirement into two discrete parts: first, the or-
der must involve an "important issue" and second, it must be "separa-
ble" from the underlying merits of the case. 20 7
Concluding that the order "'resolves an important issue,"' the
Court reasoned that the discussion of involuntary medication of pre-
trial criminal defendants is "important" because "involuntary medical
treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance."208 No-
ticeably absent from the Court's opinion is any reference to precedent
cases recognizing "importance" as a valid requirement for collateral
order jurisdiction. Most significant, the Court failed to refer back to
its opinion in Digital Equipment Corp., the one unanimous opinion up-
205. Joint Appendix at 351, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
This is precisely the argument made by the Solicitor General in the government's Supple-
mental Brief at 7, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
206. See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Philip
Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003); supra Part II.
207. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2182.
208. Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468).
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holding the role of "importance" in collateral order decisions. In-
stead, the Court simply stated that the importance of the issue at bar
warrants immediate review. Then, as a seeming afterthought, the
Court unremarkably concluded that the "separability" requirement is
satisfied because the decision about whether Sell should be involunta-
rily medicated is "completely separate from the merits of the action,"
the charges of Medicaid fraud and money laundering on which he
had been indicted. 20 9 Further, the Court noted that "the issue is
wholly separate as well from questions concerning trial procedures,"
forecasting its decision to allow immediate appeal of the challenge
based on fair trial grounds, which it did by not restricting Sell's appeal
to the due process and First Amendment challenges. 210
Perhaps the greatest confusion and inconsistency in the Court's
opinion is revealed in its analysis of the "unreviewability" requirement.
Because it adopted "irreparable harm" or "irretrievable loss" of impor-
tant rights as absolute touchstones of "unreviewability" without further
explanation or guidelines, the Court threatens to expand the collat-
eral order doctrine beyond reason.
The beginning of the Court's analysis is consistent with earlier
cases citing "irreparable" or "permanent" harm as indicia of "un-
reviewability," noting that "[b]y the time of trial Sell will have under-
gone forced medication-the very harm that he seeks to avoid. He
cannot undo that harm even if he is acquitted. Indeed, if he is acquit-
ted, there will be no appeal through which he might obtain review." 21a
The Court then switches its focus to the intrusion on defendant's
rights in a way that could cause them to be "irretrievably lost." Again,
this is consistent with earlier decisions. If the Court had then ex-
plained how post-conviction review would fail to remedy these harms,
it likely would have avoided criticism.
However, the Court failed to complete its analysis and instead
concluded that "[t]hese considerations, particularly those involving
the severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the
constitutional issue," 212 provide the basis for the decision that the or-
der was effectively unreviewable and therefore satisfied the collateral
209. Id.
210. Id. Despite the Court's conclusory analysis of this issue, the government had ar-
gued in its supplemental brief that issues of fair trial were "unsuited" to collateral review
because of their overlap with the "factual and legal issues of the underlying dispute." Sup-
plemental Brief for the United States at 10, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003)
(No. 02-5664).
211. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2182.
212. Id.
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order doctrine's requirements. The problem with this analysis, as the
dissent points out, is that from the way the Court has phrased its rea-
soning it appears that "harm" or "irretrievable loss" can substitute for
any other evidence of "effective unreviewability" and could open the
door for collateral review of orders that might in fact be reviewable
after final judgment. 213
In addition to the possibility of creating a new avenue for collat-
eral appeal, the Court's analysis fails to clearly explain its application
to the two challenges to the district court's involuntary medication
order. The "harm" and "irretrievable loss" formula clearly supports
the appealability of the order on due process and First Amendment
grounds, but its application to the fair trial challenge is less clear. The
Court tries to explain its holding by attempting to distinguish between
the question of "whether Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medica-
tion, perhaps in part because medication may make a trial unfair" and
the question of "whether forced medication did make the trial un-
fair."214 The Court concluded:
213. The Court would have been better served by more clearly illustrating how Sell's
loss of liberty would be unreviewable after final judgment. Several circuit courts have em-
ployed the same analysis when explaining their application of the collateral order doctrine
to cases involving pretrial psychiatric issues. See, e.g., United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d
392, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted):
[A]n appeal from a competency evaluation order is analogous to an appeal from
a denial of bail. If appeal is not allowed from an order requiring pretrial deten-
tion, there can be no remedy for the resulting loss of liberty .... The issue be-
comes moot upon conviction and sentence. The same is true here. Not only
would [defendant] be subjected to a 30-day confinement in a mental institution,
but he also would be subjected to the additional intrusion of a forced medical
examination. If he is declared competent and the trial proceeds, post-confine-
ment review will provide no relief for the loss of liberty associated with the compe-
tency evaluation.
See also United States v. Gold, 790 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1986):
Unlike a ruling that the defendant is competent and must proceed to trial, which
could be effectively reviewed and remedied, if erroneous, on appeal from any
final judgment against him, an order finding that a defendant is not competent
to stand trial and committing him for hospitalization would be effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment. First, there may never be a criminal
trial if the defendant is never found competent to stand trial; in this instance,
there would be no appellate review. If the defendant eventually were found com-
petent to stand trial and were acquitted, there again would be no appellate re-
view. If the defendant were eventually found competent to stand trial and were
convicted, the commitment order could be reviewed on appeal from his convic-
tion; but the matter of the relief to be granted if the order were found to have
been erroneous would be moot. Whether or not the conviction were set aside,
nothing could recover for the defendant the time lost during his confinement;
probably no one could be held liable to him in damages for the loss of his liberty.
214. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2177.
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[T] he first question focuses upon the right to avoid administration
of the drugs. What may happen at trial is relevant, but only as a
prediction. ... The second question focuses upon the right to a
fair trial. It asks what did happen as a result of having administered
the medication. An ordinary appeal comes too late for a defendant
to enforce the first right; an ordinary appeal permits vindication of
the second. 2 15
This explanation falls short because fair trial rights are effectively
reviewable after trial-they can be remedied by an appeal after convic-
tion and reversal of that conviction would be enough to remedy any
violations. 216 The reviewability of trial rights violations is clearly sup-
ported by the Court's decision in Riggins where it held that prejudice
to the defendant's trial rights caused by improper involuntary medica-
tion was sufficient to warrant a reversal of his conviction. 217
Therefore, the Sell opinion's inconsistent application of "con-
clusivity," its bifurcation of "separability," and its adoption of "irrepa-
rable harm" or "irretrievable loss" as seeming alternatives for, rather
than indications of, "effective unreviewability" only stand to add un-
certainty to the already complex nature of collateral order
jurisprudence.
C. Scalia's Dissent-A Narrow and Inconsistent Approach to
Collateral Order Determinations
Although the Court's opinion in Sell arguably extends the collat-
eral order doctrine beyond reasonable limits, the position advocated
by the dissenters, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas, threatens to
restrict the doctrine to such a narrow class of orders that the contin-
ued existence of the doctrine would be nearly meaningless. Where the
Court found the order involved to be completely conclusive and unre-
viewable, the dissent found it to be completely reviewable. 2 18 Their
concern for potential misuse of immediate appeals led the dissenters
to overlook the valid exercise of pre-final judgment appeals and to so
restrict the collateral order doctrine's application that even orders
215. Id. at 2183.
216. This is central to the dissent in Sell; see also Supplemental Brief for Respondent at
13, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
217. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-38 (1992).Justice Scalia also uses Riggins
to support his contention that both the fair trial and due process challenges in Sell are
effectively reviewable after conviction. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2189.
218. The dissent does not address directly whether it agrees that the order is suffi-
ciently conclusive to satisfy the collateral order requirement, although it does insert a par-
enthetical judgment "(correct)" as it lists the conclusivity element in a summary of the
Court's application of the collateral order; instead it rests its entire analysis on the order's
inability to satisfy the third requirement: unreviewability. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2190-91.
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previously granted collateral order status would hardly satisfy the
requirements.
The entire basis for the dissenting opinion is that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's medication or-
der until such time that Sell was either convicted or acquitted of the
underlying criminal charges. 219 Blaming the Eight Circuit's error on
either the fact that the government did not contest jurisdiction or the
fact that the other circuits had already concluded that such orders
qualified for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine,
the dissent concludes that "this Court's cases do not authorize appeal
from the District Court's [pretrial] order, which was neither a 'final
decision' under § 1291 nor part of the class of specified interlocutory
orders in § 1292."220 Although the dissent acknowledges that the
Court has "invented" (a term it uses "advisedly" to indicate lack of
statutory basis) 221 a narrow exception to the final judgment rule, it
stresses that the exception is not and should not be applicable to pre-
trial medication orders because such orders are not "effectively unre-
viewable" at the time of final judgment.
After reviewing the historical application of the collateral order
doctrine to criminal cases and emphasizing the fact that the doctrine
had only previously been applied to three criminal orders, the dissent
attempted to distinguish the order before it from those earlier appli-
cations. Denials of motions to reduce bail are distinguishable, the dis-
sent posits, because they were found to be "unreviewable" because the
fact that bail was not reduced becomes moot at final judgment.222 The
dissent correctly relied on Riggins to conclude that involuntary medi-
cation orders are not rendered moot by conviction on the underlying
charges. 223 Double jeopardy and Speech or Debate cases, as explained
by the dissent, involve situations where "it was appropriate to interrupt
the trial when the precise right asserted was the right not to be tried."224
Seemingly overlooking prior explanations that the characterization of
a right as a "right not to be tried" is not the touchstone of collateral
order qualification, the dissent rests its argument on an assertion that
the issue involved with pretrial medication orders is not a "right not to
be tried, but [rather] a right not to be medicated."225 As a result, the
219. See id. at 2189 (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)).
220. Id. at 2187-88.
221. Id. at 2189 n.4.
222. Id. at 2190.
223. Id. at 2189.
224. Id. at 2190.
225. Id.
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dissent concludes that the pretrial involuntary medication order fails
to satisfy the "unreviewability" requirement of the collateral order
doctrine.226
To support its conclusion of reviewability, the dissent again
pointed to Riggins where the defendant had also been involuntarily
medicated based upon a pretrial order but had brought his appeal
after his ultimate conviction for murder. The dissent relied on the fact
that the Court in Riggins did not find that post-conviction review of
the defendant's substantive-due-process claim was impossible but
rather it addressed the arguments, agreed with the defendant, and
vacated his conviction. 227 Consequently, the dissent concluded, "the
Court is therefore wrong to say that 'an ordinary appeal comes too
late for a defendant to enforce' this right ... and appellate review of
any substantive-due-process challenge to the [pretrial] order [in Sell's
case] must wait until after conviction and sentence have been
imposed." 228
Further, to bolster its reading that involuntary medication orders
are in fact reviewable after final judgment, the dissent readily dis-
missed the possibility that a criminal defendant like Sell would have
no avenue for redressing harm to his person or irreparable loss of
constitutional rights if acquitted of the criminal charges. The dissent
stated:
To be sure, the order here is unreviewable after final judgment if
the defendant is acquitted. But the "unreviewability" leg of our collat-
eral-order doctrine-which, as it is framed, requires that the inter-
locutory order be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment,"-is not satisfied by the possibility that the aggrieved
party will have no occasion to appeal."229
The dissent alleges that while the kind of review available may not
provide the "type of remedy he would prefer," availability of post-con-
viction relief is sufficient to satisfy "reviewability. ''230
The dissent's interpretation of the reviewability requirement evi-
dences either a misunderstanding of or an intentional misreading of
the Court's collateral order cases. First, it implies that neither irrepa-
rable harm nor irretrievable incursion on constitutional rights is suffi-
cient to render an order "effectively unreviewable," and asserts that
226. Id. at 2189 n.5.
227. See id. at 2189.
228. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting majority opinion).
229. Id. at 2189 n.5 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at 2189.
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such grounds have never been recognized by the Court.23 1 Justice
O'Connor forecast this analysis during oral argument when she re-
sponded to Petitioner's assertion that failure to review the medication
order would cause permanent and irreversible effects on Sell's body:
I think you're confusing unreviewable with irreversible. To be sure,
it can't be reversed, but can it be reviewed? In the case of bail, it
can't be reviewed because once the trial is over, it's a moot ques-
tion. It cannot be reviewed. It's not just that it can't be reversed, it
cannot be reviewed. But you're here asserting that this issue cannot
be reviewed. It seems to me that's just patently false. It can be re-
viewed. Your complaint is that it can't be reversed, but that has
never been the, the Cohen criterion. 2 32
The dissent criticizes the Court's decision because of the adverse
effects of the new rule of law that underlies the holding. The Court's
opinion announces that appellate jurisdiction is proper because re-
view after conviction and sentence will come only after "Sell will have
undergone forced medication-the very harm that he seeks to
avoid." 23 3 Calling the effects of such a ruling a "breathtaking expan-
sion of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders,"23 4 the dissent
argues that the Court's holding will allow "any criminal defendant
who asserts that a trial court order will, if implemented, cause an im-
mediate violation of his constitutional (or perhaps even statutory?)
rights" 23 5 to immediately appeal and to thus "hold up the trial for
months by claiming that review after final judgment 'would come too
late' to prevent the violation."23 6
The dissent continues to support its position by setting forth
three possible scenarios it alleges would be "immediately appealable"
under the Court's holding. 237 First, it illustrates "[a] trial-court order
requiring the defendant to wear an electronic bracelet" and character-
izes it as "an immediate infringement of the constitutional right to
'bodily integrity.' 2 38 Second, it points to "an order refusing to allow
the defendant to wear a T-shirt that says 'Black Power' in front of the
jury" and predicts a challenge based on "an immediate violation of
First Amendment rights. ' 239 Finally, it gives the example of "an order
231. Id.
232. Oral argument transcript at 8, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003) (No. 02-
5664).
233. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2177.
234. Id. at 2190.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
Winter 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
compelling testimony" and foresees an accusation that such is "an im-
mediate denial of Fifth Amendment rights. '240
However, the dissent overlooks the fundamental difference be-
tween these illustrations and the situation involving the involuntary
administration of drugs into a defendant's system. Despite its claim
that "appellate review of orders that might infringe a defendant's con-
stitutionally protected rights still had to wait until final judgment,"24'
this interpretation is clearly at odds with the numerous instances in
which the Court relied upon both irreparable harm to the party and
irretrievable loss of rights as indications of an order's "effective
unreview [ability]. "242
The dissent also offers a skewed reading of Court precedent when
it asserts that "orders denying an asserted right not to be tried" offer
an alternative "gate of entry to the collateral-order doctrine"243 rather
than being a subset of those orders found to be unreviewable. It is
true that the Court has stated:
[T]he characterization of the right at issue determines the legal
result. In each case, therefore, a careful inquiry must be under-
taken to determine whether it is necessary to characterize the right
at issue as a right not to stand trial. The final judgment rule pre-
supposes that each party must abide by the trial court's judgments
until the end of the proceedings before gaining the opportunity
for appellate review. To hold that a given legal claim is in fact an
immunity from trial is to except a privileged class from undergoing
the regrettable cost of a trial. We should not do so lightly.2 44
However, to assert that the entirety of the Court's collateral order ju-
risprudence supports the "right not to stand trial" as an alternative
ground for immediate appeal is to ignore the more recent statements
that a party's ability to characterize the rights involved as a "right not
to stand trial" should not be determinative in collateral order
decisions.2 45
Finally, the dissent errs in accusing the Court of creating a "brand
new consideration" or a "novelty with no basis in our prior opinions"
with its inclusion of an "importance" factor in the collateral order de-
cision. 246 The dissent also ignores the underlying consideration in all
collateral order determinations that when deciding the appealability
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See supra Part III.
243. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2190.
244. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 551 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994).
246. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2191.
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of a category the Court should look to the "competing considerations
underlying all questions of finality" including costs and inconvenience
of piecemeal review on one hand and the "danger of denying justice
by delay" on the other 247-a consideration that at the very least im-
plies that the importance of the rights involved plays a role in the
ultimate decision.
It appears that the dissent's fear that recognizing involuntary
medication orders as appealable collateral orders will overrun the
court system with pretrial appeals has overshadowed both its reading
of precedent and its interpretation of the doctrine's requirements.
Again, this fear was forecast during oral argument when Justice Scalia
commented:
I'm truly concerned about, about the extent to which this new ex-
ception would, would be available to disrupt criminal trials consid-
erably. For example, a defendant, instead of challenging the, the
order initially can, can half-way through trial decide he does not
want any medication, and then the trial has to be postponed so
that, so that the order to continue the medication can be appealed.
Ijust see real difficulties in running a criminal justice system when,
when this kind of an order is immediately appealable, rather than
reviewable at the end of the criminal case. 248
This fear resurfaces in the dissent as it charges that the Court's "nar-
row holding will allow criminal defendants in petitioner's position to
engage in opportunistic behavior."249 The dissent's reasoning is
flawed in that it overlooks the other requirements of the collateral
order doctrine that would prevent immediate appeals in many circum-
stances and that other measures can be taken to prevent abuse or de-
lay caused by such appeals.
The government explained the practical effects of extending the
collateral order doctrine's reach to involuntary medication orders in
its Supplemental Brief on the jurisdictional issue and suggested that
such extension would not unreasonably burden the appellate sys-
tem.250 First, it suggested that to the extent challenges to involuntary
medication orders are based on violations of substantive due process
and First Amendment rights, a Court ruling that defendants could be
medicated consistent with those rights would "remove that issue from
the realm of legal claims that can support a collateral order ap-
247. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995).
248. Oral argument transcript at 6-7, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct 2174 (2003) (No.
02-5664).
249. Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 2190.
250. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 17, Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct
2174 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
Winter 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
peal." 251 Second, it reminded the Court that once a "general legal rule
permitting involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medications in
order to restore a defendant to competence" is established, future
cases "can and should be dealt with in a more summary fashion than
the appeal in this case."2 52 For example, challenges based on a district
court's factual findings would be subject to a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review and could be "expeditiously" reviewed without causing
inordinate delay or expending too many appellate resources. 25 3 Like-
wise, challenges to the district court's discretion, to the extent they
would be appealable at all under the collateral order doctrine, could
be handled expeditiously. 25 4
Therefore, after considering the ways in which the Court's deci-
sion itself would mitigate potential delays caused by immediate ap-
peals of involuntary medication orders, it seems that the dissent's
concern is exaggerated if not unwarranted. And even if some delay is
injected into the system, the "considerations that favor immediate ap-
peals seem comparatively strong" in contrast to the "comparatively
weak" considerations of such minor delay.2 55
D. A Proposal for Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine While
Supporting the Policies Underlying the Final Judgment
Rule
The Court could have used its opinion in Sell to illustrate how the
"important" and "unreviewable" analyses embodied by the collateral
order doctrine could be applied to allow a narrow avenue for immedi-
ate appeal while still sufficiently serving the interests of the final judg-
ment rule. Rather than expanding the scope of the doctrine's
requirements or unnecessarily restricting appeals under the doctrine,
the Court could have used its opinion on involuntary medication or-
ders to show how the collateral order doctrine can strike a balance
between protecting "important rights" and protecting finality and
scarce judicial resources. The foundation for such a decision lies in
the distinction between Sell's two challenges to the order: substantive
due process and First Amendment rights versus fair trial rights. This
section will propose how the Court could have found the district
court's order appealable under the collateral order doctrine while still
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995).
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retaining the narrow nature envisioned by its traditional
requirements.
First, the Court could have determined that the district court's
order was "conclusive" with respect to Sell's due process and First
Amendment challenges while determining it "inconclusive" with re-
spect to the fair trial challenge. The order allowing involuntary medi-
cation conclusively resolves that the government may override the
defendant's substantive due process rights and any residual First
Amendment rights that may lie in objecting to the medication. Once
the medication is administered it cannot be unadministered-merely
allowing the government to give the medication determines conclu-
sively that the government's interest in its attempt to restore defen-
dant's competence outweighs his right to remain free from that
medication. Thus, a decision that the challenge to the order satisfies
the first collateral order requirement acknowledges the importance of
the rights involved. Conversely, the district court's order was not con-
clusive with reference to Sell's fair trial rights. The district court never
conclusively resolved whether Sell's right to a fair trial would be vio-
lated by allowing the government to administer antipsychotic medica-
tion against his will. In fact, the district court noted the potential of a
"serious issue" but found consideration of that issue "premature,"256
concluding that the challenge based on fair trial rights would fail
under the first requirement of the collateral order doctrine.
Second, both challenges to the district court's involuntary medi-
cation order satisfy the "separability" requirement of the collateral or-
der doctrine. The government's ability to administer antipsychotic
medication to a pretrial criminal detainee against his wishes has noth-
ing to do with that detainee's guilt or innocence of the underlying
charges, whatever they may be. Unlike cases involving double jeopardy
challenges, or even Speech or Debate challenges, where the appellate
court would almost certainly be forced to examine at least some of the
factual and legal components of the underlying charges, review of in-
voluntary medication orders is completely separable from any crimes
of which the defendant stands accused.
Third, the Court could have determined that the district court's
order was "unreviewable" with respect to Sell's due process and First
Amendment challenges while determining it "reviewable" with respect
to the fair trial challenge. This conclusion would have allowed the
256. Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, No.
4:98CR290-DJS, 4:98CR177-DJS (April 4, 2001), reprinted in joint Appendix at 339, 351-52
Sell v. United States, No. 02-5664, 2003 WL 21372378 (2003).
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Court to better articulate the role that "importance," "irreparable
harm," and "irretrievable loss" play in collateral order decisions.
A challenge to the district court's involuntary medication order
based on fair trial rights would fail the "unreviewability" test because
post-conviction review would not subject the defendant to "irreparable
harm" nor would his trial rights be "irretrievably lost." The vacating or
reversal of a resulting conviction would certainly suffice to remedy any
harm the defendant may have suffered if medication rendered him
unable to receive a fair trial. This decision would not undermine the
importance of fair trial rights because it would be consistent with
other challenges to convictions based on trial rights that result in de-
fendants going free.
In contrast, a challenge to the district court's involuntary medica-
tion order based on infringement of a defendant's substantive due
process or First Amendment rights would be "effectively unreview-
able" because such infringement of these "important" rights would
cause the defendant "irreparable harm" that could not be remedied at
final judgment because the rights themselves would be "irretrievably
lost." The whole of the Court's jurisprudence supports the contention
that substantive due process rights are "important"257 and would al-
most certainly be classed among the rights the Court envisioned when
it established the collateral order doctrine to grant review for those
orders "too important to be denied review." 258 Antipsychotic medica-
tion infringes upon the recipient's rights of bodily integrity, personal
autonomy, and freedom of thought. Arguably, these rights could be
characterized as fundamental and require the application of strict
scrutiny before government infringement is allowed. Even if these
rights do not rise to the level of being fundamental, they assuredly
comprise an important liberty interest sufficient to warrant immediate
appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
Further, refusing immediate appeal to challenges based on sub-
stantive due process and First Amendment rights would lead to irrepa-
rable harm to the defendant. Although it seems obvious, once the
government is allowed to medicate a defendant nothing can be done
to "unmedicate" him. While it is true that the effects of the medica-
tion-which are temporary and not like the potentially fatal, lasting
effects associated with many antipsychotic drugs-the defendant can
257. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965).
258. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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never be restored to his pre-medication condition. In addition, the
time spent medicated can never be restored to the defendant, and
that resulting loss of liberty is irreparably lost absent immediate ap-
peal. As the Sixth Circuit stated, "because the order relates to the ad-
ministration of drugs in order to restore [defendant's] competency to
stand trial, it would be of little value to [him] for this court to review
his due-process claim after he has been forcibly medicated and the
trial has concluded. '259 At that point the harm is done; it cannot be
undone.
Similarly, a defendant's substantive due process and First Amend-
ment rights would be "irretrievably lost" absent an immediate appeal.
Even if the order could be reviewed after a final judgment, "the legal
and practical value" 260 of the rights would be "irretrievably lost" and
any later review would be ineffective. Just as a defendant is not forced
to stand trial before appealing a denial to dismiss based on double
jeopardy because merely standing trial would cause the defendant "to
endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to pro-
hibit,"261 forcing a defendant to wait until after he has been medi-
cated to appeal forces him to endure an invasion that both the Fifth
and First Amendments were "designed to prohibit." Thus, even if post-
judgment review were possible, such review would not be "effective."
As the Second Circuit concluded, "[i]f the defendant should prevail
after he has been forcibly medicated, his right to refuse to be medi-
cated would have been lost and his victory would be a hollow one."262
Post-trial review would also be ineffective because it would have
no real consequences for the defendant. As the Fourth Circuit rea-
soned when addressing the same issue: "Once [defendant] has been
forcibly medicated pursuant to the order, a determination of the pro-
cedural safeguards to which he was entitled prior thereto would
amount to a purely academic exercise." 263
This analysis would lead to the conclusion that challenges to in-
voluntary medication orders based on substantive due process or First
Amendment grounds are appealable as collateral orders while those
based on fair trial grounds are not. Such a decision would uphold the
policies underlying the final judgment rule (minimizing the costs as-
sociated with additional appeals and avoiding unwarranted delay).
259. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 951 (6th Cir. 1998).
260. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
261. Id.
262. United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2002).
263. United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 259 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Such limited appeals, especially when further restricted by the sugges-
tions proffered by the government in Sell,264 would not add cost, in-
convenience, or delay sufficient to outweigh the "danger of denying
justice by delay[ing] ''265 review of these important, if not fundamen-
tal, rights.
Conclusion
If the Court had separated the challenges involved in Sell's ap-
peal as suggested above, it could have avoided making what will now
likely be seen as a revision in the collateral order requirements. It
could have retained the limited nature of orders open to immediate
appeal without introducing the loophole recognized by the dissent for
"importance" to trump "unreviewability." Instead it has only served to
further complicate decisions of appellate jurisdiction. Judges on the
court of appeals can only hope that the Court will be given the oppor-
tunity to remedy its action sooner rather than later.
264. See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2190 (2003).
265. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
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